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In the Supreme Court of the Stale of Utah 
In the Matter of the Estate of 
1CLA UDIUS W ALLICH, Deceased, 
FRED R. W ALLICH, 
Petitioner and Appellant 
-vs -
A. C 'VALLICH, et al., 
Cross-Petitioners 
and Respondents. 
Case No. 
10569 
APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Appeal from Judgment of the Third Judicial 
District Court in and for Salt Lake County, 
The Honorable A. H. Ellett, Presiding 
SKEEN, WORSLEY, SNOW. k 
CHRISTENSEN and JOSEPH 
J. PALMER 
701 Continental Ban~~~rrY OF UT.AM 
Salt Lake City, Utah -· 
and 
JOHN L. MACE JAN 1 3 1967 
615 South Flower Street 
Los Angeles, California Lr\ 'IV LI BRAU 
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MARK & SCHOENHALS and lj-- , ~ :(:.,~ n 
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In the Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
In the Matter of the Estate of 
·CLAUDIUS W A!LLICH, Deceased, 
FRED R. W ALLI CH, 
Petitioner and Appellant 
- vs -
A. C W ALLI CH, et al., 
Cross-Petitioners 
and Respondents. 
Case No. 
10569 
APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Petitioner and Appellant Fred R. \Vallich petitions 
for a rehearing after decision of the above entitled Court 
filed November 15, 1966, on the following grounds: 
1. rrhe Court misstates and fails to state or pass 
upon some of the appellant's principal contentions which, 
if correctly stated, would require reversal. 
2. The decision relies in part upon extrinsic evidence 
proferred by the respondents and at the same time fails 
to pass upon the appellant's claim that the trial court 
committed reversible error in refusing to admit extrinsic 
evidence proferred by appellant. 
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I 
THE COUR,T FAILS TO STATE OR PASS UPON 
APPELLANT'S CLAIM THAT THE WAIVEH OF 
ACCOUNTING HAS BEEN INCORPORATED IN A 
DECREE OF DISTRIBUTION WHICH HAS BE-
COME FINAL AND IS RES ADJUDICATA UPON 
THE ISSUE IN SUBSEQUENT PROCEEDINGS. 
Appellant's principal ground for reversal is that the 
Decree of Distribution dated February 24, 1959, incorpo-
rated by reference all of paragraph 8 of the will of the 
decedent, including the provision that no accounting shall 
be required, and that this Decree of Distribution has 
become final and is res adjudicata upon the issues here 
presented. 
In the opinion, the Court erroneously states that the 
appellant "protests that the Court has no jurisdiction 
over him to determine the honesty and propriety of his 
dealings in connection with the trust." 
Appellant has not attacked the jurisdiction of the 
Court at any time. 
By claiming that the final judgment of February 
8, 1959, which relieves petitioner of the requirement for 
filing an accounting, cannot now be set aside in the same 
3 
proceedings and petitioner be required to account in de-
fiance of the precise terms of the prior final judgment, 
the appellant relies upon the doctrine of res adjudicata 
as applied in the cases cited jn appellant's briefs.1 This 
j s not an attack upon the jurisdiction of the Court. 
The Court had jurisdiction to determine whether 
an accounting would be required of the trustee. It exer-
cised that jurisdiction by determjning in its decree of 
February 24, 1959, that no accounting would be required. 
That determination has become final and is res adjudi-
cata. 
As declared in Miller v. Walker Bank, "except for 
fraud" a decree of distribution which has become final 
is not subject to attack. These proceedings do not involve 
any claim or evidence of fraud. Appellant concedes that 
if fraud were, charged in an appropriate proceeding, the 
Court would have jurisdiction upon that issue. 
The opinion evades facing the issue on this point by 
failing to state that the waiv('r of accounting has been 
1Shattuck v. Shattuck, 192 P. 2d 229 (Ariz.) 
In Re Wallace's Estate, 219 P.2d 910 (Cal.) 
In Re Loring's Estate, 175 P.2d 524 (Cal.) 
Brindley v. Mitchell, 228 P.2d 689 (Kan.) 
Miller v. Walker Bank, 17 Ut. 2d 88, 404 P.2d 675 
For quotations, see Brief of Appellant, pages 18-23, and Reply 
Brief, pages 4-7. 
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included in a prior final decree of distribution of this 
Court in the same proceedings. 
Instead, in the last sentence of the opinion the Court 
states, "A provision in a document which would have 
the effect of preventing one from being required to ac-
count ... is against public policy and will not be enforced." 
In that one sentence if the Court would change the word 
"document" to "judgment" or "final decree of distribu-
tion" the Court's error would he apparent. 
The Court against misstates appellant's position in 
the following language quoted from the opinion: 
"The final point we direct attention to is 
appellant's insistence that even as a trustee he 
could not be required to render an accounting 
... because of the provision in the will that 'in 
the administration of the trust herein imposed 
upon him, he shall act without the necessity of 
making any accounting to any person or party." 
The Court denounces this proposition as "specious 
argument" and "untenable." As stated by the Court 
(supra) this argument is indeed specious and untenable. 
But this is not the argument made by appellant. 
Appellant's argument is that the will provisions have 
been incorporated in a decree of distribution which has 
become final. The will, as such, is functus officio and 
has been superseded by the final decree and is res adjudi-
cata, having been incorporated in the decree. The opinion 
establishes at the outset that the provisions of paragraph 
8 of the will have been effectively incorporated in the 
final decree. This includes the provision that no account-
ing may be required. 
Appellant doe·s not rely upon the ·will, as stated in the 
opinion, but upon the final decree of distribution. 
The opinion cites authorities (Note 7) that the pro-
visions in an intervivos trust not created by a judgment 
which waive an accounting will not be enforced. The opin-
ion fails to cite any authority for the proposition that a 
provision in a final decree of distribution which waives 
accounting will not be enforced. The opinion refuses to 
cite, discuss or attempt to distinguish the appellant's 
cases (Note 1, supra) from several states holding that an 
invalid ·will provision which has been incorporated in a 
final judgment is enforceable because it is res adjudicata. 
It is manifestly unfair to misstate appellant's posi-
tion and then proceed to castigate it as "specious" and 
"untenable.'' 
Appellant submits that a rPhearing should be granted 
in furtherance of justice basrd upon this point a.lone. 
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II 
THE COURT FAILS TO STATE OR PASS UP-
ON APPELLANT'S CLAIM THAT ERROR. \VAS 
COMMITTEiD IN T'HE DENIAL OF ITS PROF-
ERREiD EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH 
TESTATOR'S INTENT, ALTHOUGH IN DE,CLAR-
ING A TRUST THE OPINION RELIES IN PART 
UPON EXT'RINSIC EVIDENCE PROFERRED BY 
RE8PONDENTS. 
In Point V o.f Brief of Appellant it is argued at 
length that certain detailed extrinsic evidence offered by 
appellant should have been admitted to ascertain whether 
a trust was intended by the will. 
The opinion fails to touch upon this contention. But 
in the course of the opinion the Court relies upon extrin-
sir evidence offered hy respondents in declaring a trust. 
This evidence offered by respondents is the receipt~ 
signed by appellant "as trustee" and a change in the name-
of the holder of the stock certificates. 
For the many reasons set forth in the Brief of Ap-
pellant there are many ambiguities and contradictions 
in paragraph 8 of the will. 
7 
The refusal of the trial Court to admit the extrinsic 
evidence proferred for the purpose of reso.Iving these am-
biguities and of ascertaining the decedent's intent consti-
tuted error which deprived appellant of a full hearing 
upon this issue and was therefore violative of the consti-
tutional safeguards as to due process. 
It is respectfully submitted that for the reasons here-
in set forth, a rehearing should be granted. 
Respectfully submitted, 
SKEEN, WORSLEY, 
SNOW & CHRISTENSEN 
By -------------- --------- ------- ----- -------------------
Joseph J. Palmer 
and 
JohnL. Mace 
Attorneys for Appellant 
Fred R. Wallich 
